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The Availability of Respondeat Superior
in SEC Administrative Proceedings
INTRODUCTION

A longstanding controversy in the area of securities law is the
question of the vicarious liability of a broker' or dealer 2 for the
unlawful acts of its registered representatives. 3 Liability is often
4
asserted under both the statutory provisions of the securities acts
and the common law doctrine of respondeat superior. 5 In injunctive6 and private damage7 actions in the federal courts, liability

1. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (1976) defines the term "broker" for purposes of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 to mean "any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of others, but does not include a bank."
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5) (1976) defines the term "dealer" for purposes of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 to mean
any person engaged in the business of buying and selling securities for his own
account, through a broker or otherwise, but does not include a bank, or any person
insofar as he buys or sells securities for his own account, either individually or in
some fiduciary capacity, but not as part of a regular business.
Most brokerage firms transact business in the capacities of both broker and dealer. The
term "broker-dealer" has evolved to designate a brokerage firm engaging in the business of
buying and selling securities to or for customers.
3. See generally Reininger, Exclusive or Concurrent - The Role of Control and Respondeat Superior in the Imposition of Vicarious Civil Liability on Broker-Dealers,9 SEC. REG. L.
REv. 226 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Reininger]; Comment, Rule 10b-5 and Vicarious Liability Based on Respondeat Superior, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1513 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Rule 10b-5 and Vicarious Liability]; Comment, A Comparison of Control Person
Liability and RespondeatSuperior:Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 CAL W.
L. REV. 152 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Comment, A Comparison1 ; Comment, Vicarious
Liability of Controlling Persons Under the Securities Acts, 11 LoY. L.A.L. Rav 151 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Comment, Vicarious Liability of Controlling Persons]; Comment,
Secondary Liability of ControllingPersons Under the Securities Acts: Toward an Improved
Analysis, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 1345 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Secondary Liability
of ControllingPersons].
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77o (Securities Act of 1933, § 15), 78 (Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15,
providing for the registration and regulation of brokers), 78t (Securities Exchange Act of
1934, § 20, commonly known as the controlling persons provision) (1976).
of a servant or other agent). See also infra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
6. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1976). In addition to its power to institute administrative proceedings against persons and firms registered with it, the SEC has specific statutory authority
to bring an action in a federal district court to enjoin violations of the securities laws by any
person. Id.
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is imposed on a broker-dealer based upon direct violations of the
antifraud provisions of the securities acts, 8 aiding and abetting in
a securities fraud, 9 the common law doctrine of respondeat superior, 10 and the statutory controlling persons provisions of the securities acts. 1
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) uses these
same bases of liability in its administrative proceedings 2 to
impose liability on brokerage firms. The applicability and scope of
respondeat superior and the controlling persons provisions in SEC
administrative proceedings, however, is presently unclear due to

7. Any person who believes he has been injured due to a violation of the securities laws
may bring a civil action in the courts for damages under various sections of the securities
acts.
8. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(q)(a) (Securities Act of 1933, § 17(a)), 78j(b), 78n(e), 78o(cX1) (Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 10(b), 14(e), 15(c)(1)) (1976).
9. Section 876 of the Restatement of Torts provides:
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is
subject to liability if he... (b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach
of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to
conduct himself, or (c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a
tortious result and his own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of
duty to the third person.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 876 (1939). In Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F.
Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966), aff'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,397 U.S. 989 (1970),
the court acknowledged that there is nothing in the Securities Acts or their legislative
histories indicating a congressional intent to impose aiding and abetting liability. The court
held, however, that an aider and abettor could be held liable under section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5. Relying upon section 876 of the Restatement of Torts, the court found that "general
principles of the law should continue to guide the development of federal common law
remedies under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5." Id. at 680. The court noted that liability for
aiding and abetting based on common law tort principles was nothing more than a "logical
and natural complement" to implying a private right of action under rule 10b-5, which also
developed from general principles of tort law. See also SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975); Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973).
10. See supra note 5.
11. 15 U.S.C. § 77o (Securities Act of 1933, § 15), 78t(a) (Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
§ 26) (1976). For the text of these provisions, see infra notes 35,38. Control is not defined under
the securities acts and the courts' analyses of the type of control required to bring one within
the purview of the controlling persons statutes is uncertain. Two approaches toward defining controlling persons have developed. One standard defines control by status and requires
no affirmative conduct on the part of the controlling person to impose liability. The second
standard requires a showing of control in fact over the activity, transaction, or institution
through which the perpetrator acted. For analyses of the concept of controlling person, see
Reininger,supra note 3, at 230; Comment, A Comparison,supra note 3, at 156; Comment,
Vicarious Liability of ControllingPersons,supra note 3, at 152; Comment, Secondary Liability of ControllingPersons,supra note 3, at 1345. For purposes of this article it is assumed
that a broker-dealer firm falls within the definition of a controlling person.
12. Administrative proceedings are brought before an administrative agency as distin-
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the congressional enactment of section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,13 which provides for the registration and regulation of brokers and dealers and applies solely to administrative
proceedings. 14 Section 15(b)(4) grants the SEC power to institute
administrative proceedings against a broker-dealer for willful violations of the securities acts under several specific bases of liability. A careful reading of the bases of liability available under section 15(b)(4) reveals their similarity to those traditionally relied
upon in the federal courts. Subsection 15(b)(4)(D)15 is similar to the
common law doctrine of respondeat superior, while subsection
15(b)(4)(E) 6 appears analogous to section 20(a), the controlling
17
persons provision of the Exchange Act.
No cases have yet addressed whether subsections 15(b)(4)(D)
and (E) are the administrative equivalents of these traditional
bases of liability. Until these sections are judicially construed, the
question of whether they are narrower, broader, or equivalent in
scope to the respondeat superior and controlling persons bases of
liability remains unresolved. Moreover, their apparent equivalence
raises the question of whether the SEC must rely exclusively upon
the 15(b)(4) provisions in its proceedings, or whether the traditional bases of liability may also be employed.
This note will address the question of whether the SEC should
be limited to subsections 15(b)(4)(D) and (E) when seeking to hold a
broker-dealer vicariously liable in an administrative proceeding.
First, the common law doctrine of respondeat superior will be
examined. Next, the relationship between respondeat superior and
statutory vicarious liability in nonadministrative proceedings will
be discussed and extended to clarify the relationship between subsections 15(b)(4)(D) and (E). Finally, the legislative history and
judicial interpretation of section 15(b)(4) will be reviewed and
analyzed.

guished from judicial proceedings which are brought before the courts. Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) administrative proceedings can only be brought against a
person or firm registered with the Commission, or with respect to a security registered with
the Commission. The sanctions which the SEC may impose in an administrative proceeding include censure, limitations on the registrant's activities, and revocation of registration.
13. 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1976).
14. Id. § 78o(b)(4)D)-(E). These provisions are commonly known as § 15(bX4XD)-(E) of
the Exchange Act. For the text of these provisions, see supra notes 73,75.
15. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(bX4XD) (1976). See infra note 73 for the text of the provision.
16. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(bX4XE) (1976). See infra note 75 for the text of the provision.
17. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1976). See infra note 38 for the text of this provision.
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THE COMMON LAW BASIS FOR BROKER-DEALER
LIABILITY: RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR
The doctrine of respondeat superior posits the rule that a master,
or other principal, must bear the responsibility for injuries caused
18
by his servant acting within the scope of his employment. It is
premised on the principle that one who benefits from the acts of
another must also bear the liability for any injuries resulting from
such acts. 19 The doctrine is not based on negligence or the failure
to supervise, but is one of strict liability, precluding the defenses of
good faith and due diligence. 20 The unavailability of such defenses
renders respondeat superior a very potent doctrine for the SEC and
private securities plaintiffs, through which vicarious liability may
be imposed for violations of the securities acts. Respondeat superior is thus an important basis of liability because it insures that a
broker-dealer will be held accountable for the wrongdoing of its
employees.
Both employer-employee and principal-agent relationships are
included within the scope of this doctrine. 2' The type of conduct
giving rise to employer liability is liberally defined, and includes
all actions falling within the legitimate scope of the employee's
authority. Additionally, the employer may be liable for actions
which, although not strictly within the "scope of employment," are
22
facilitated by the existence of the employment relationship.
Rationales for the respondeat superior doctrine are founded on
accepted notions of public policy, convenience, and justice. 23 Underlying the application of the doctrine in an employment setting is a
basic notion of fairness-that an employer who reaps benefits
from the acts of his employee, or who facilitates the acts, should be
held accountable for those acts. In addition, considerations of the
greater ability of the master to bear the loss, 24 his ability to spread

18. E.g., Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124, 1130 (4th Cir. 1970); 53 AM. JUR.
21 Master and Servant § 417 (1970); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 216 comment a

(1958).
19.
20.
21.
22.
1980);

53 AM. JUR 2D Master and Servant § 417 (1970).
3 AM. Jun. 2D Agency § 261 (1962).
Id. §§ 261, 267.
Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1118-19 (5th Cir.
Lewis v. Walston & Co., 487 F.2d 617,623 (5th Cir. 1973); 3 AM. Jun. 2D Agency § 267
(1962); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 216 comment a (1958).
23. New York Central & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481,494 (1909); 3
AM. Jun 2D Agency § 261 (1962).
24. Draper v. Olivere Paving & Constr. Co., 54 Del. 433, 181 A.2d 565,569 (1962).
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the risk, 25 and the increased incentive for the master to conduct
his business properly 26 justify the application of this common law
doctrine.
Common law agency principles, including the doctrine of respondeat superior, have been applied frequently to various federal
statutes by the courts. 27 This application is particularly true in the
area of corporate litigation 28 and rests upon the authority of the
federal courts to utilize common law principles to enforce federally
created rights, when such principles are necessary to effectuate the
congressional purpose. 29 Common law respondeat superior has
been applied specifically to the securities acts to hold brokerage
firms vicariously liable in securities fraud cases for the acts of their
30
broker-employees.
In addition, both the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 provide specifically for controlling person
liability.31 These statutory provisions impose vicarious liability on
broker-dealers for the wrongdoing of their registered representatives. A significant distinction between the statutory and the
common law bases of liability is that the statutory provisions contain a good faith defense for the controlling person, while respon-

25. Rodgers v. Kemper Constr. Co., 50 Cal. App. 3d 608, 124 Cal. Rptr. 143 (1975).
26. Draper v. Olivere Paving & Constr. Co., 54 Del. 433, 181 A.2d 565,569 (1962).
27. See, e.g., United States v. A&P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121,125 (1958) (Motor Carrier
Act); New York Central & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 493 (1909)
(Elkins Act); United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973) (Sherman Act).
28. See, e.g., United States v. A&P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121,124 (1958); SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801,812 (2d Cir. 1975).
29. Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae at 4, Henricksen v. Henricksen, 640 F.2d 880 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 669 (1981).
30. See, e.g., Henricksen v. Henricksen, 640 F.2d 880, (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct.
669 (1981); Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1118-19 (5th Cir.
1980); Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1011
(1980); Holloway v. Howerdd, 536 F.2d 690, 694-95 (6th Cir. 1976); SEC v. Management
Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801,812-13 (2d Cir. 1975); Kerbs v. Fall River Indus., Inc., 502 F.2d
731,741 (10th Cir. 1974); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124,1130 (4th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974). But see Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 521 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975) (holding that an employer's liability is not based on the doctrine
of respondeat superior). Compare Reininger, supranote 3; Comment, Rule lOb-5 and Vicarious Liability, supra note 3; and Comment, Secondary Liability of Controlling Persons,
supra note 3 (concluding that respondeat superior and the controlling persons provisions
are simultaneously available) with Comment, A Comparison,supra note 3 (concluding that
controlling persons liability should be based exclusively on the controlling persons
provisions).
31. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7 7o, 78t(a) (1976); see infra notes 35,38.
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deat superior does not. 32 Thus, the common law doctrine of
respondeat superior represents a much stricter standard of liability
for a broker-dealer. Consequently, much attention has focused on
the role of respondeat superior after the congressional enactment
of statutory vicarious liability. The primary focus has been the
relationship between the common law doctrine and the section 20
controlling persons provision of the Securities Exchange Act. 33 An
examination of this relationship provides an instructive analogy
to the relationship, in the same Act, of subsections 15(b)(4)(D),
which parallels respondeat superior, and 15(b)(4)(E), which parallels section 20.
THE STATUTORY BASIS FOR SECONDARY LIABILITY:
THE CONTROLLING PERSONS STATUTES

Congress first provided for vicarious liability of controlling persons in section 15 of the Securities Act of 1933. 34 This section provides that a controlling person is liable jointly and severally, and
to the same extent as the controlled person, to any person to whom
the controlled person is liable. 35 Additionally, it provides a defense
for the controlling person who had no knowledge of the violation
or no reasonable grounds to believe that a basis for liability
36
existed.
32. "Good faith" has been defined in the broker-dealer context as compliance with
standards of reasonable care in the supervision of their employees. It is an objective test and
represents the majority view. See Note, The Burden of Control: Derivative Liability Under
Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1019, 1037 (1973).
33. See, e.g., Henricksen v. Henricksen, 640 F.2d 880 (7th Cir.), cert.denied, 102 S. Ct. 669
(1981); Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111 (5th Cir. 1980);
Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1011
(1980); Holloway v. Howerdd, 536 F.2d 690, 694-95 (6th Cir. 1976); SEC v. Management
Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801,812-13 (2d Cir. 1975); Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1052
(7th Cir. 1974); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124, 1130 (4th Cir. 1970). But see
Christoffel v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 588 F.2d 665-67 (9th Cir. 1978); Rochez Bros., Inc. v.
Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1975); Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 521 F.2d 1129, 1132-33 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1976).
35. Section 15 provides:
Every person who, by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise, or who,
pursuant to or in connection with an agreement or understanding with one or
more other persons by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise, controls
any person liable under sections 77k or 771 of this title, shall also be liable jointly
and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person to any person
to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person had no
knowledge of or reasonable grounds to believe in the existence of the facts by
reason of which the liability of the controlled person is alleged to exist.
Id. § 77o.
36. Id.
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In the following year, Congress enacted the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (Exchange Act).37 Section 20(a) 38 of the Exchange Act
is a controlling persons provision which parallels section 15 of the
Securities Act of 1933. Section 20(a) also provides that a controlling
person is liable, to the same extent as the controlled person, to any
person to whom the controlled person is liable. 39 Consistent with
section 15 of the 1933 Act, section 20(a) of the Exchange Act also
contains a defense for controlling persons, precluding the imposition of strict liability. Thus, under section 20(a), a controlling person who acts in good faith and does not induce the violation will
not be held liable. Congress did not, however, expressly address
the issue of the continued viability of respondeat superior in securi40
ties litigation. Predictably, this issue became controversial.
In attempting to resolve the competing tensions between those
who argue that liability can be established solely under the controlling persons provisions, with their respective defenses, and
those who favor establishing strict liability under respondeat
superior, courts have focused on the legislative history leading to
the enactment of the controlling persons statutes. The Second Circuit adopted this approach in SEC v. Management Dynamics,
Inc.,4 1 an SEC enforcement action for injunctive relief. In Management Dynamics, the court upheld an injunction against a
broker-dealer whose vice president had issued fictitious quotations
to create a false impression of interest in a particular stock.4 2 The
firm argued that its liability should be measured under the controlling person provision of section 20(a). The SEC argued, however,
that respondeat superior was the appropriate basis for imposing
liability on the broker-dealer. 43

Id. § 78.
Id. § 78t(a). This section provides:
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under any
provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall also be liable
jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person to any
person to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person
acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action.
39. Id.
40. See cases cited supra note 33.
41. 515 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1975).
42. Id. at 805.
43. Id. at 812.
37.
38.

236
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The court analyzed the legislative history of the controlling per-

sons provisions and indicated that, before common law agency
principles could be statutorily preempted, the court must find by

"clear evidence" that Congress intended to replace respondeat

superior with the controlling persons provisions. 44 Failing to find
such clear evidence, the court stated that the legislative history of
the provisions "gives no indication that Congress intended them to
govern employer liability. ' 45 It determined that Congress, by
enacting sections 15 and 20(a), sought to expand rather than narrow the scope of employer liability under the securities laws. This
expanded scope imposes liability on a firm's controlling shareholders or officers who would otherwise escape liability under
agency principles because they do not fall within the traditional
employer-employee relationship. 46 The court indicated that control
is broadly defined "to reach prospective wrongdoers rather than
permit the escape of those who would otherwise be responsible for
the acts of their employees." 47 Further, in the court's opinion, the
statutory provisions represented an expansion of liability to reach
those who attempt to escape liability by acting through "dummy"
directors. 48 Thus, the court held that section 20(a) did not supersede common law respondeat superior, and that both theories
were, in fact, concurrently available to impose vicarious liability

44.
45.

Id.
Id. The court drew this conclusion, notingThe legislative history of § 20(a), and of its analogue in the Securities Act of
1933, § 15, gives no indication that Congress intended them to govern employer
liability. Section 15 had its genesis in the concern that directors would attempt to
evade liability under the registration provisions by utilizing "dummy" directors to
act in their stead. S.Rep.No.47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933); H.R.Conf.Rep.No.
152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1933). And § 20(a) was consciously modeled after § 15
of the 1933 Act. As Thomas C. Corcoran, one of the authors of the 1934 Act,
testified before the Senate Committee:
Without reading those paragraphs [of what is now § 20], the first is taken
verbatim from the Securities Act. The purpose is to prevent evasion of the provisions of the section by organizing dummies who will undertake the actual things
forbidden by the section (citation omitted).
Id. at 812.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 813.
48. Id. at 812. The Fifth Circuit in Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630
F.2d 1111 (5th Cir. 1980), confirmed the Second Circuit's interpretation of the legislative
history of the controlling person provision when it stated: "The legislative history of §§ 15
and 20(a) demonstrates that Congress enacted those sections to address the specific evil of
persons seeking to evade liability under the acts by organizing 'dummies,' that, acting
under their control, would commit the prohibited acts." Id. at 1118. The court in Newton
concludes that Congress did not intend to limit secondary liability for violations of the
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on broker-dealers. 49
In a subsequent case, it was noted that such an expansion of
liability, beyond that imposed under common law, should be
accompanied by statutory defenses not available in an employeremployee context.5 0 In providing statutory defenses to controlling
persons, however, the SEC contended that the congressional purpose of protecting the public can be preserved only if the employer
continues to be subject to the strict liability imposed by respondeat
superior. 5 1 According to the SEC, the combination of the statutory
provisions and the common law basis of secondary liability is
needed to complete a framework of liability which can successfully
52
effectuate this congressional purpose.
In addition to legislative intent, the court in Management
Dynamics articulated several other factors which influenced its
conclusion that respondeat superior and section 20(a) are concurrently available to impose broker-dealer liability for violations of
the securities acts.5 3 The court first emphasized the importance of
the vice president's position in the firm and the apparent authority
he derived from that position to the success of the scheme. The
opinion also pointed to the clear language of the statute itself to
support its conclusion that agency principles are available, noting
that the word "person," a key term in the securities acts, is defined
to include a corporation. 54 The court reasoned that this language
manifested a congressional intent to make agency principles
available, since a corporation can act only through its agents.
Thus, the language of the statute, in the court's opinion, supports
the logical conclusion that agency principles are available in
55
imposing employer liability.
In the 1980 decision of Marbury Management,Inc. v. Kohn,56 the
Second Circuit affirmed its earlier finding in Management Dynamics. In Marbury, the court of appeals allowed respondeat superior
as a source of secondary liability in a rule 10b-5 damages action,

securities acts to the controlling person provisions of those acts. Id. at 1118-19.
49. 515 F.2d at 812.
50. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 10, Henricksen v. Henricksen, 640
F.2d 880, (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 669 (1981).
51. Id. at 11.
52. Id. at 10.
53. 515 F.2d at 812.
54. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(9) (1976) defines the term "person" to mean "a natural person,
company, government, or political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of a government."
55. 515 F.2d at 812.
56. 629 F.2d 705 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1011 (1980).
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where an employee of a brokerage firm misrepresented himself as
a registered representative of the firm. The court in Marbury noted
that section 28(a) of the Exchange Act 57 specifically provides that
the rights and remedies created by the Act do not displace, but
rather, supplement, all other rights and remedies that might exist
at law or in equity. 58 The court, therefore, affirmed the use of
respondeat superior in actions under the Exchange Act to impose
liability independently of section 20(a).
Courts have also considered the policies underlying the securities
laws and have found that the congressional purpose was to protect
unsophisticated investors from fraudulent practices. 59 The Fifth
Circuit, in PaulF. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank,60 recognized this legislative concern, noting that most investors rely on
the reputation and prestige of the brokerage firm they choose, and'
that it would contravene congressional intent to allow these firms
to escape liability for the fraudulent practices of their employees. 6 1
The court found it consistent with the remedial purpose of the
securities acts that an employer be held liable under agency principles. This result, according to the court, recognized the importance of providing protection to the investing public.6 2 The court
emphasized that imposing common law respondeat superior is not
the equivalent of imposing an insurer's liability on an employer;
the requirements of agency principles, that the agent act within
the course and scope of his employment, and that he act within his
actual or apparent authority, restrict the scope of the principal's
63
liability.
The Supreme Court has not ruled on whether the use of the
statutory basis of section 20(a) and the common law basis of
respondeat superior to impose secondary liability is exclusive or
concurrent. Although the appellate courts are not in agreement on
this issue, the emerging majority of circuits which have considered
the question, hold that agency principles and the controlling persons provisions are concurrently available to impose vicarious
liability.64
57.
58.
59.
1980).
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

15 U.S.C. § 78x(a) (1976).
629 F.2d at 716.
See, e.g., Paul F. Newton v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1119 (5th Cir.
Id. at 1111.
Id. at 1119.
Id.
Id.
See cases cited supra note 32.
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SECTION 15(b)(4) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT

The preambles of the securities acts indicate that the legislature
intended to protect the public from fraud and unfair practices by
providing for full and fair disclosure and regulation of the industry.6 5 Both securities acts are remedial and are to be construed
broadly. 66 Such broad construction accomplishes this congressional purpose of protecting the public, especially unsophisticated
67
investors, from fraudulent practices.
Section 15 of the Exchange Act provides for the registration and
regulation of brokers and dealers. 68 Under section 15(b)(4) of the
Act the SEC may sanction a broker or dealer for securities violations.6 9 The statute provides that the imposition of such sanctions
must be "in the public interest. ' 70 The language of section 15(b)(4)
expressly provides that the SEC may sanction any broker or
dealer not only for its own violations, but also for the violations of
"any person associated with such broker or dealer." 71 Thus, under
this provision, a brokerage firm can be held directly accountable
for the wrongdoing of its employees.
Broker-dealer activities giving rise to SEC sanctions are broadly
defined in subsections 15(b)(4)(A) through (F).72 The broadest pro-

65. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1976) (the preamble states the purpose of
the Act is "[to] provide full and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate
and foreign commerce and through the mails, and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof, and
for other purposes."); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1976) (the preamble to
this Act announces that the purpose of the Act is "[t]o provide for the regulation of securities
exchanges and of over-the-counter markets operating in interstate and foreign commerce
and through the mails, to prevent inequitable and unfair practices on such exchanges and
markets, and for other purposes.").
66. Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1118 (5th Cir. 1980).
67. Id. at 1119.
68. 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1976).
69. Section 78o(b)(4) provides:
The Commission, by order, shall censure, place limitations on the activities, functions, or operations of, suspend for a period not exceeding twelve months, or
revoke the registration of any broker or dealer if it finds, on the record after notice
and opportunity for hearing, that such censure, place of limitations, suspension,
or revocation is in the public interest and that such broker or dealer, whether prior
or subsequent to becoming such, or any person associated with such broker or
dealer, whether prior or subsequent to becoming so associated70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. § 78o(b)(4)(A-F). Subsection A reaches those who willfully make a false or misleading statement to the SEC in any application, report or proceeding. Id. § 78o(b)(4)(A).
Subsection B imposes sanctions for the conviction of certain crimes, particularly those
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vision under which sanctions may be imposed is subsection
D, 73 which specifically addresses liability for various securities
violations. Subsection 15(b)(4)(D), read together with the introductory paragraph to section 15(b)(4), imposes a standard of strict
liability upon a broker or dealer for its own wrongdoing, or that of
its employees. It makes no provision for any defenses such as good
faith or adequate supervision of the employee. Thus, it appears to
be the statutory equivalent of the common law doctrine of respondeat superior, through which the SEC can reach culpable brokerdealers in its administrative proceedings. Still unresolved, however, is whether subsection D and respondeat superior are in fact
equivalent, and whether the SEC may rely on respondeat superior
in its proceedings should subsection D be construed judicially as
7 4
narrower in scope than the common law basis of vicarious liability.
Subsection 15(b)(4)(E) imposes sanctions on any person who
willfully contributes to another person's violation of the securities
laws, and on those in a supervisory position who fail to reasonably
supervise a violator. 75 This provision permits the SEC to reach the
supervisory level of personnel within a brokerage firm directly.
Notably, subsection E includes a defense for the vicariously liable

crimes related to securities dealings. Id. § 78o(bX4XB). Further, any person who has been
enjoined from acting in a given capacity within the securities industry may be sanctioned
for any lack of compliance with that injunction under subsection C. Id. § 78o(b)(4XC). Those
who have been barred or suspended from associating with. a broker or dealer are prevented
from doing so thereafter under subsection F. Id. § 78o(bX4XF).
73. Section 15(bX4XD) provides:
has willfully violated any provision of the Securities Act of 1933 [15 U.S.C. 77a et
seq.], the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 [15 U.S.C. 806-1 et seq.], the Investment
Company Act of 1940 [15 U.S.C. 80a-1 et seq.], this chapter, the rules or regulations under any of such statutes, or the rules of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, or is unable to comply with any such provision.
74. The scope of section 15(bX4XD) and whether it is equivalent to respondeat superior is
an unresolved issue which is beyond the scope of this article. It should be noted, however,
that the issue is a valid concern of the SEC in that, should it lose its ability to rely on
respondeat superior, the SEC's power to sanction violators of the securities acts may be
significantly diminished.
75. Section 15(bX4XE) provides:
has willfully aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, or procured the violation by any other person of any provision of the Securities Act of 1933, the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, the Investment Company Act of 1940, this
chapter, the rules or regulations under any of such statutes, or the rules of the
Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, or has failed reasonably to supervise,
with a view to preventing violations of the provisions of such statutes, rules, and
regulations, another person who commits such a violation, if such other person is
subject to his supervision. For the purposes of this subparagraph (E) no person
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person, who must demonstrate that established supervisory procedures were reasonably discharged 86 Thus, subsection E is similar
to section 20(a) of the Exchange Act, which also imposes vicarious
liability on a controlling person for the wrongdoing of a firm's
employees, subject to the defenses of good faith and noninducement of the violation. The distinction between the two provisions is
that section 20(a) is available to impose liability in actions in either
the federal courts or in SEC administrative proceedings, 77 while
78
15(b)(4)(E) is available exclusively in SEC proceedings.
Congress enacted subsections 15(b)(4)(D) and (E) for use solely in
SEC administrative proceedings. Yet, the similarity between subsection 15(b)(4)(D) and the doctrine of respondeat superior, as well
as the similarity between subsection 15(b)(4)(E) and the controlling
persons provision of the securities Exchange Act, present the interesting question of whether respondeat superior and section 20(a)
may also be used, either singly or concurrently, by the SEC as
bases of liability in its administrative proceedings. Congressional
79
intent concerning this issue is unclear.
A comparison of subsections 15(bX4XD) and (E) poses an additional
problem. Since many actions brought under subsection 15(b)(4)(D)
could be characterized as a failure to supervise, it could be argued
that such actions should be brought exclusively under subsection
15(b)(4)(E) with its accompanying defenses.8 0 This argument, if
successful, would preclude the stricter standard of vicarious liabil-

shall be deemed to have failed reasonably to supervise any other person, if(i) there have been established procedures, and a system for applying such
procedures, which would reasonably be expected to prevent and detect, insofar
as practicable, any such violation by such other person, and
(ii) such person has reasonably discharged the duties and obligations incumbent
upon him by reason of such procedures and system without reasonable cause
to believe that such procedures and system were not being complied with.
76. See also Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 521 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025
(1975). In this case the Ninth Circuit stated the rationale behind § 15(bX4XE)'s requirement
that a brokerage firm supervise those who personally deal with the investing public. Id. at
1135. The court found that the financial gains for the broker-dealer and the representatives
are directly related to sales. Additionally, the client relies on the representative for investment advice and the opportunity of the latter to take advantage of the client is ever present.
Thus, holding the broker-dealer vicariously liable ensures diligence of supervision and control. The court concluded that the nature of the securities business requires that this rule be a
public policy which should be strictly enforced by the courts. Id.
77. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7 7o, 78t(a) (1976). See supra notes 35,38.
78. Id. § 78o(bX4). See supra note 75.
79. See supra note 30; see also supra note 45 and accompanying text.
80. See supra note 75.
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ity under subsection 15(b)(4)(D) in administrative proceedings
when failure to supervise is an issue.
Legislative History of Sections 15(b)(4)(D) and (E)
Sections 15(b)(4)(D) and (E) were added to the Securities Exchange Act in 1964.81 The House report, which accompanied the
bill enacting these amendments, stated that the purpose of the bill
was to implement the SEC recommendations for amendments to
the securities acts.8 2 The SEC recommendations were developed in
a two year study, commissioned by Congress, on the adequacy of
the securities laws for the protection of investors.8 3 The House
report indicated that one of the major objectives of this legislation
was to strengthen the qualification standards and disciplinary
controls with respect to security industry personnel.8 4 The SEC
acknowledged that, although the securities laws were generally
strong, some abuses did exist, necessitating additional controls
and improvements.8 5 In its testimony before the House, the SEC
stated that enactment of these amendments, including sections
15(b)(4)(D) and (E), would provide it with the power needed to protect the investing public adequately.
Against this background of the general purposes behind the
enactment of sections 15(b)(4)(D) and (E), it is important to note
that at the time these provisions were proposed, the SEC practice
was to use respondeat superior as a basis of vicarious liability in
its administrative proceedings.8 6 As early as 1945, the SEC would
find a firm vicariously liable on the principle that "the willful
violations by [the employee], committed in the course of his
employment, constitute willful violations by [the firm]."8 7 This
history could indicate that Congress was aware of the SEC's use of
respondeat superior at the time sections 15(b)(4)(D) and (E) were
enacted, and that it did not intend to limit that use as the result of
the legislation. In addition, the Senate report on the amendment
indicated that the purpose of section 15(b)(4)(E) was to allow the
SEC to reach a firm's middle or upper level employees with super-

81. 78 Stat. 565, 571-72 (1964).
82. H.R. REP. No. 1418, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1964).
83. REPORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R. Doc. No.95, part 1,
88th Cong., 1st Sess. 328 (1963).
84. H.R. REP. No.1418, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1964).
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., E.H. Rollins & Sons, Inc., 18 S.E.C 347 (1945).
87. Id.
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visory responsibilities rather than the firm itself 88 In order to prevent those individuals from being held as absolute guarantors of
their supervisees' conduct, the reasonable care defense was incor89
porated in that provision.
JudicialInterpretation
The question of whether section 15(b)(4)(E) displaces the doctrine
of respondeat superior was directly addressed by the Sixth Circuit
in the 1970 decision Armstrong, Jones & Co. v. SEC.90 This case
was an appeal from an SEC administrative proceeding which
resulted in sanctions of both the firm and its chief officer under
section 15(c)(1) 91 for its employees' wrongdoing. The SEC sanctioned the firm after it found that the sales manager and various
salesmen made unsubstantiated predictions to induce customers to
purchase stock, thus violating various sections of the securities
acts.92 The brokerage firm did not seriously dispute the finding
that unwarranted predictions had been made by its employees, but
did contend, however, that the firm itself could not be found to
have willfully violated the Act due to the unauthorized acts of its
agents.93 The brokerage firm argued that a finding that it willfully
violated the Exchange Act was equivalent to a finding that it
failed to supervise its employees adequately. 94 It contended that
failure of adequate supervision was a separate ground for remedial
action, to be brought only under section 15(b)(4)(E) of the Securities
Exchange Act, and not under respondeat superior. 95
The appellate court disagreed, stating that the SEC had long
asserted that a brokerage firm may be sanctioned for the willful
violations of its agents under the doctrine of respondeat superior. 96 The court stated that "the fact that Congress enacted an
additional provision giving the Commission the power to impose a
sanction on a broker-dealer for failure to adequately supervise its

88. SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, REPORT ON SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMM. LEGISLATION, S. REP. No. 379,88th Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1963).

89. Id.
90. 421 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1970).
91. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(cXl) (1976).
92. 421 F.2d at 361.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 362.
95. Id.
96. Id. The court cited the following as authority for this statement: Cady, Roberts & Co.,
40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961); H.F. Schroeder & Co., 27 S.E.C. 833,837 (1948). Id.
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employees does not limit the Commission's power to discipline a
broker-dealer for its employees' acts."97 In so stating, the Sixth
Circuit squarely held that Congress did not intend to limit the
SEC's use of respondeat superior by enacting section 15(b)(4)(E),
and that both bases of liability were thus available in SEC administrative proceedings. 9
Armstrong was later cited by the Second Circuit in SEC v. Geon
Industries, Inc.,99 an injuctive action against a broker-dealer, in
which the court refused to apply respondeat superior. In Geon, a
registered representative of a brokerage firm was found to have
improperly received inside information from the president of a
company. The court upheld the trial court's finding that there was
no failure to supervise and declined to issue an injunction, noting,
however, that the facts presented a close question. 10 0
The SEC argued that pursuant to the decision in Management
Dynamics, the brokerage firm should be held liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior even though there was no failure to
supervise. 10 1 The court, however, distinguished Geon and declined
to extend to it the rule of Management Dynamics.10 2 The distinction made was that Management Dynamics involved a high level
employee who used both his position in the firm and his "apparent
authority" from the firm to accomplish his fraudulent acts. Geon,
on the other hand, did not involve a high level employee, but only a
registered representative, who made no special use of his connection with the brokerage firm. The Geon court concluded that while
an injunction was an appropriate remedy in Management Dynamics, 10 3 the differing circumstances in Geon did not warrant such
relief. 10 4 The Second Circuit, therefore, declined to apply to Geon
its rule of Management Dynamics, that even absent a finding of a
failure to supervise, respondeat superior was a theory of liability
available to the SEC.
In Management Dynamics and Geon, the Second Circuit, rather

97. 421 F.2d at 362.
98. Id.
99. 531 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1976).
100. Id. at 54. The court indicated that had the question come before them on review of
an order of the SEC under § 15(b)(5)(E) or after a finding of the district court of a negligent
failure to supervise, that ruling would have been sustained. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 55.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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than positing a general rule of law, specifically indicated that each
holding was confined to the facts of the case at bar. Although
neither court directly addressed the availability of respondeat
superior in an administrative proceeding involving a failure to
supervise, the analysis in Geon is nonetheless instructive, because
it reveals the factors which a reviewing court might weigh in
determining whether the use of respondeat superior is an appropriate basis of liability in an SEC proceeding.
Although the court declined to pass on the validity of the Management Dynamics holding, it acknowledged the wide latitude of
sanctions available to the SEC which a federal district court considering injunctive relief does not enjoy. 10 5 The court noted that
through the sanctions imposed in its administrative proceedings
the SEC could affect practices and procedures throughout the
entire industry. 06 The flexibility inherent in these proceedings,
the court commented, enabled the SEC to make a much greater
impact on the industry than that which could be accomplished by
a single court injunction, affecting only a limited number of parties. 10 7 The Geon court declined to issue an injunction in this case
because, in the court's view, the facts did not justify the harsh
08
result.
Another factor considered by the Geon court was that the firm
played merely an attentuated role in the violation; the representative had made no special use of his connection with the firm, and
ordinary commissions were the only profit the firm realized.10 9 The
court balanced the need for an injunction in these circumstances with the potentially harsh consequences to the firm, and
held that once it was determined that the brokerage firm exercised
reasonable supervision, no injunction should be issued." 0
Recognizing the potentially harsh consequences, the Geon court
refused to apply a strict liability doctrine where the penalty was
harsh, the justification slight, and the policies of the securities acts
not furthered. The Geon decision indicates, however, that the
courts may be more receptive to the use of respondeat superior in

105. Id. at 54.
106. Id. at55.
107. Id.
108. Id. If an injunction had issued, for example, the brokerage firm could easily be held
in contempt for the actions of another of its registered representatives regardless of the
adequacy of supervision. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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administrative proceedings brought under section 15(b)(4). But
even in that context, the courts will carefully scrutinize the rationale for invoking the doctrine and the appropriateness of the sanction to the wrongdoing.
A recent Seventh Circuit decision provides several additional
factors for the courts to weigh in assessing the applicability of the
statutory and common law bases of liability. Henricksen v. Henricksen,1 '1 involved a private damage action in which the plaintiff
brought a securities fraud suit against her former husband, a registered stockbroker, and his former employer, the investment firm
of Smith, Barney, Harris, Upham & Co., Inc. (Smith Barney). The
plaintiff, Wendee Henricksen, alleged that the investment firm
was liable under both section 20(a), the statutory controlling persons provision, and the common law doctrine of respondeat superior for conversion and fraudulent mismanagement due to its failure to supervise.
The court held that the firm was in fact liable under section 20(a)
as a controlling person.1 1 2 The court found that Smith Barney was
not reasonably diligent in its supervision of its representative, and
consequently, could not meet the good faith defense of section
20(a). 1 3 In finding liability, the court focused on the fiduciary relationships between the brokerage firm, its representative, and its
customer. The court found that Smith Barney had a fiduciary duty
directly to its customer which encompassed a duty to supervise its
employees."14 That the account in this case was discretionary as
well as employee related, the court stated, did not in any way
relieve Smith Barney of its duty to supervise its employees, but, to
the contrary, enhanced that duty." 5 The opinion stated that the
primary agency relationship created by the discretionary account
was between the plaintiff and Smith Barney, with its agent acting
on Smith Barney's behalf." 6 Mrs. Henricksen, therefore, had the
right to rely on the brokerage firm's fiduciary obligation to manage her account in accordance with her stated investment objectives. Moreover, she had the right to rely on the professional judgment of the firm's representative "subject to the review and

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

640 F.2d 880 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 669 (1981).
Id. at 887.
Id. at 885.
Id.at 888.
Id.at 887.
Id.at 886.
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ultimate control of Smith Barney's supervisory personnel." 117
In addition to finding the brokerage firm liable under section
20(a) as a controlling person, the Henricksen court also held that
the firm was independently liable under the common law theory of
respondeat superior. 118 Such liability again was based on Smith
Barney's fiduciary duty directly to its customer, which included
the duty to supervise its representatives. The court concluded that
statutory liability and common law liability were independent theories, simultaneously available in this action.1 1 9 Thus, section
20(a) did not preclude application of the strict liability imposed
under respondeat superior.
The reasoning of the Henricksen court may be extended to clarify the bases of liability available in administrative proceedings
brought under section 15(b)(4).120 Henricksenheld that a fiduciary
duty exists between the brokerage firm and the investor in a discretionary account. 121 The court premised its holding on two facts:
first, that such a relationship includes a duty to supervise; and
second, that section 20(a) and respondeat superior, each incorporating a duty to supervise, are independent bases of liability. Taking this second premise one step further, because section 20(a) and
section 15(b)(4)(E) of the Exchange Act are parallel provisions, it is
reasonable to conclude that section 15(b)(4)(E) would also be an
independent basis of liability separate from that imposed by
respondeat superior. Given that respondeat superior, too, has its
statutory parallel in 15(b)(4)(D), it follows that the defense provided
in section 15(b)(4)(E) would not preclude liability under section
15(b)(4)(D) in administrative proceedings.
ANALYSIS

A review of both legislative history and judicial analysis indicates that respondeat superior is available to the SEC in imposing
secondary liability on brokerage firms in section 15(b)(4) administrative proceedings. The legislative history of sections 15(b)(4)(D)

117. Id.at 888.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 887-88.
120. The reasoning of the Henricksen court is essentially based upon what has come to
be known as the "shingle theory." In Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir.
1943), the court accepted the SEC's argument that a broker-dealer firm which solicited
business on the basis of "the confidence in itself which it managed to instill in its customers," was under a duty not to overreach its customers, even when dealing with them as
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and (E) indicates that these amendments are additional bases of
liability, through which Congress intended to strengthen the
SEC's power to adequately protect the investing public. Moreover,
there is no clear evidence of congressional intent to replace agency
principles with these amendments.
As the legislative history reveals, section 15(b)(4)(E) is an expansion of liability intended to reach supervisory personnel who are
not technically employers. 122 It is appropriate that this expansion
afford the supervisor a defense which makes his liability commensurate with his actual role in the securities firm. The reasonable
care defense is an appropriate concomitant to this expanded liability because Congress never intended that supervisory personnel
should be subjected to the strict liability standards of respondeat
superior. The underlying rationales of respondeat superior do not
apply to supervisory employees. 123 It is the firm, not the supervisor, that provides a wrongdoer with the position and authority
that facilitates the wrongdoing. Additionally, it is the firm that
realizes the benefits of the employees' services. Thus, the firm
should be liable for any wrongdoing resulting from the employment relationship. The supervisor, who neither facilitates the
wrongdoing nor benefits from it, is responsible only in a supervisory capacity and should be allowed the defense of having reasonably discharged his supervisory duties.
In contrast, it is also appropriate that the broker-dealer be held
to the standard of strict liability imposed by agency principles
because the firm realizes the benefits of an employee's services,
and the employment relationship facilitates a representative's
actions. In light of these considerations, the firm should be liable
1 24
for its agent's actions under respondeat superior.
The clear language of the statute also supports the conclusion
that agency principles are available in SEC proceedings. As noted
in Management Dynamics,125 the specific language of a statute

"principal." Id. at 437. Under the "shingle theory," a broker-dealer firm that hangs out its
"shingle" as an expert in securities and offers advice to customers on their transactions will
be held to violate the antifraud provisions of the securities acts if it doesn't make full

disclosure of possible conflicts of interest or other facts material to the customer's investment decisions, when dealing with the customer.
121. 640 F.2d at 886.
122. See supra notes 82-84,88-89 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
124. Id.
125. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
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must be examined to determine a provision's applicability. Management Dynamics held that since for purposes of the securities
acts the term "person" includes a corporation, 126 and a corporation can act only through its agents, agency principles are available to the SEC in addition to the section 15(b)(4)(E) basis of liability. Furthermore, section 28(a) of the Exchange Act also bolsters
the conclusion that respondeat superior is available in SEC proceedings by specifically stating that the rights and remedies
created by the Act do not displace other rights and remedies which
27
exist at law or in equity.
At least one court has held that the SEC may use respondeat
superior in administrative disciplinary proceedings, and that such
use is not limited by section 15(b)(4)(E).1 28 Application of respondeat superior has been cautious, however, and is premised upon
certain factors which warrant its use. The courts have employed a
balancing test in determining whether liability will be imposed on
a brokerage firm under respondeat superior. 29 They have balanced the hardship which results from court injunction, with the
need for such relief. This balancing test demands that the court
carefully consider the particular facts and circumstances before it,
and that the relief granted be appropriate to the wrongdoing
involved. Reviewing courts employing a balancing approach also
scrutinize the agent's capacity and authority within the firm and
the extent to which his connection with the firm is used to accomplish the wrongdoing. 30 Courts recognize that the investing public
chooses a brokerage firm based upon its prestige and reputation.
Accordingly, they have imputed an increasing degree of liability
on the broker-dealer where the violator was a high ranking
employee who used the firm's credibility to accomplish his wrongdoing.' 3 ' Therefore, both the status of the employee and the extent
of the brokerage firm's involvement in its employee's wrongdoing
weigh in the court's determination of broker-dealer liability under
respondeat superior.
Most recently, an additional rationale for imposing vicarious
liability on the broker-dealer was articulated by the court in Hen-

126. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
128. Armstrong, Jones & Co. v. SEC, 421 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1970).
129. See supranotes 105-10 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 53, 60-61, 120 and accompanying text.
131. SEC v. Geon Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1976); see also SEC v. Management
Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1975).
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ricksen.132 Holding that the statutory and common law bases of
liability are independently available, the court found that a fiduciary relationship extends directly from the broker-dealer to the
investor. This fiduciary duty serves as an unconditional basis of
secondary liability enforceable under the doctrine of respondeat
superior.
As the decisions indicate, the courts may be more receptive to the
use of respondeat superior in administrative proceedings than in
injunctive actions brought before the court.133 This stems from two
essential differences between these proceedings. In an administrative proceeding, the SEC may use a broad range of remedies, and
may effect changes in the industry as a whole. In contrast, a court
considering injunctive relief is faced with the imposition of a harsh
134
remedy whose impact is limited to the firm or firms involved.
The inherent flexibility of administrative proceedings encourages
a willingness on the part of the courts to impose vicarious liability
on the basis of respondeat superior in those proceedings.
In a similar vein, it follows from the case law and the legislative
history that sections 15(b)(4)(D) and (E) are concurrently available
to find broker-dealer liability in SEC administrative proceedings.
Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn lends support to this conclusion.' 35 The Marbury court noted that section 28(a) of the Exchange
Act 136 specifically provides that the rights and remedies created
by the Exchange Act do not displace, but supplement, all other
rights and remedies existing at law or in equity. This reasoning
indicates that respondeat superior is available in administrative
proceedings to impose liability for violation of the securities laws.
It follows from this premise that if section 15(b)(4)(D) is the statutory parallel of respondeat superior, 137 and respondeat superior is
available in administrative proceedings independently of section
15(b)(4)(E), that section 15(b)(4)(D) is also available independently
of section 15(b)(4)(E).
A comparison of the relationships between section 20(a) and
respondeat superior and between sections 15(b)(4)(D) and (E) bol-

132. Henricksen v. Henricksen, 640 F.2d 880 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 669 (1981).
133. See SEC v. Geon Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 39,55 (2d Cir. 1976); Armstrong, Jones & Co.
v. SEC, 421 F.2d 359, 362 (6th Cir. 1976).
134. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
135. 629 F.2d 705 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1011 (1980). See supra notes 57-58 and
accompanying text.
136. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1976).
137.

See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
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sters the conclusion that sections 15(b)(4)(D) and (E) are independently available to the SEC as bases of liability. The congressional
intent underlying section 20(a) was to expand common law liability so as to reach those who would otherwise escape liability by
being outside the traditional employer relationship. It is appropriate that the defenses of good faith and non-inducement of the
violation should accompany this expanded liability as long as re138
spondeat superior is applied to the actual employer relationship.
The legislative history, as interpreted by the Second Circuit in
Management Dynamics, reveals an apparent lack of congres39
sional intent to replace agency principles with section 20(a).1
Moreover, the specific language of the provision, together with
section 28(a) of the Exchange Act, support the conclusion that
respondeat superior and the controlling persons provision are
independently available to impose liability for violations of the
securities laws.
The same analysis relied upon in Management Dynamics supports the conclusion that sections 15(b)(4)(D) and (E) are also concurrently available to the SEC to find broker-dealer liability. This
conclusion accords with the legislative intent that section 15(b)(4)(E)
expand traditional liability to permit the SEC to reach supervisory
personnel within a brokerage firm. 140 As such, section 15(b)(4)(E)'s
supervisory defense does not preclude either statutory or common
law strict liability. The availability of all bases of liability accomplishes the congressional purpose of providing to the SEC the
additional controls it needs to strengthen public protection in the
securities industry.
CONCLUSION

Both legislative history and judicial analysis illustrate that
statutory and common law bases of liability are all independently
and concurrently available in SEC administrative proceedings.
Neither the history nor the judicial interpretation of section
15(b)(4)(E) indicate that it was intended to supersede or restrict the
application of respondeat superior in these proceedings. Similarly,
section 15(b)(4)(E) does not limit the application of section
15(b)(4)(D), regardless of its similarity to respondeat superior.

138.
139.
140.

See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 46,88-89 and accompanying text.
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In determining whether the SEC may continue to employ
respondeat superior, independently of sections 15(b)(4)(D) and (E),
reviewing courts should consider several factors. These include the
harshness of the penalty, the justification for the remedy, and the
effect of the doctrine on the policies of the securities laws, which
must be broadly construed to protect the investing public. Further,
the extent of the broker-dealer's involvement in its employee's
wrongdoing, and the capacity of the employee involved within the
firm must be examined.
Similarly, the SEC should examine these same factors before
sanctioning a broker-dealer under respondeat superior. In addition, the SEC should articulate the rationale supporting its use of
respondeat superior based upon the circumstances of each case.
Until sections 15(b)(4)(D) and (E) are judicially construed by the
Supreme Court, the SEC should be able to continue to rely on all
existing bases of liability. It should, however, exercise caution in
its use of respondeat superior, observing those guidelines which
the courts have articulated. This approach allows the SEC to use
the broadest basis of liability available in its administrative proceedings to insure the adequate protection of the investing public.
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